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CATHOLIC JURORS AND THE DEATH
PENALTY
GERALD F. UELMEN

INTRODUCTION

Let me start by saying that I share the judgment of Clarence
Darrow that Catholics make great jurors.'
Back in the days
when jurors were selected based upon the racial and ethnic
stereotypes of lawyers (and I am not so naive as to believe those
days are over), Clarence Darrow authored his famous essay,
"Attorney for the Defense." 2 Here's what he had to say about
Catholic jurors:
Let us assume
that
we represent one
of "the
underdogs".. . because of an indictment brought by what the
prosecutors name themselves, "the state." Then what sort of
men will we seek? An Irishman is called into the box for
examination. There is no reason for asking about his religion;
he is Irish; that is enough. We may not agree with his religion,
but it matters not; his feelings go deeper than any religion. You
should be aware that he is emotional, kindly and sympathetic.
If he is chosen as a juror, his imagination will place him in the
dock; really, he is trying himself. You would be guilty of
malpractice
if you got rid of him, except for the strongest
3
reasons.

Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law.
Clarence Darrow, Attorney for the Defense, ESQUIRE, May 1936, at 37.
2 Id. at 36.

3 Id. at 37. Darrow's enthusiasm for Catholic jurors was not universally shared.
One of the "trial manuals" recommended to me when I was a student at Georgetown
Law School offered this advice for picking juries to try an insanity defense:
Least desirable [as a juror] would be the Roman Catholic with his emphasis
on free will, moral responsibility and payment for his sins. In addition, all
fundamentalist faiths would be generally non-receptive to the defense ....
For once, the sentimental Irish and sympathetic Italians are to be avoided
because of their affinity for Catholicism. More receptive strains may be
found among the Scandinavian backgrounds.... Negroes are generally ill
equipped to evaluate psychiatric testimony.
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Darrow even liked German jurors, as long as they were
Catholics. He wrote:
The German is not so keen about individual rights except where
they concern his own way of life; liberty is not a theory, it is a
way of living. Still, he wants to do what is right, and he is not
afraid.... If he is a Catholic, then he loves music and art; he
must be emotional, and will want to help you; give him a
chance.4
If the German was Lutheran though, Darrow said:
Beware of the Lutherans, especially the Scandinavians; they
are almost always sure to convict. Either a Lutheran or
Scandinavian is unsafe, but if both-in-one, plead your client
guilty and go down the docket. He learns about sinning and
punishing from the preacher, and dares not doubt. A person
5
who disobeys must be sent to Hell; he has God's word for that.
Darrow, who was agnostic himself, had a stereotype for every
religion he encountered.6 He thought that Presbyterians were a
"bad lot" and that Baptists were even more "hopeless."7 If you
were sitting between a Methodist and a Baptist, Darrow
explained that you should "move toward the Methodist to keep
warm."8
He advised keeping Unitarians, Universalists,
Congregationalists, and Jews without asking them too many
questions. 9 As for women, Darrow concluded, "Luckily... my
services were almost over when women invaded the jury box."'1
Are Catholic jurors more likely to have qualms about the
death penalty? The demographics would suggest that they are.
It is not a coincidence that those states which do not utilize the
death penalty include the states with the highest proportion of
Catholics in their population." The few available polls seem to
LAW AND TACTICS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 265-66 (George W. Shadoan ed.,
1964).
4 Darrow, supra note 1, at 37.

'

Id. at 211.
See infra text accompanying notes 7-9.
7 See Darrow, supra note 1, at 37.
8 Id. at 211.
6

9 Id.
10 Id.

See

Adherents.com,

Religion

by

Location

(2000),

http://www.adherents.com/adhloc/Wh_199.html
(stating
the
population
of
Massachusetts is 49% Catholic); Adherents.com, Religion by Location (2000),
http://www.adherents.com/adhloc/Wh_284.html (stating the population of Rhode
Island
is 63%
Catholic); Adherents.com,
Religion by Location (2000),
http://www.adherents.com/adhloc/Wh_359.html (stating the population of Wisconsin
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confirm growing Catholic opposition to the death penalty. The
Gallup poll regularly asks, "[W]hich do you think is the better
penalty for murder-the death penalty or life imprisonment, with
absolutely no possibility of parole?"' 2 In 1999, the national
answer indicated that 56% of the population chose the death
penalty while only 38% chose life imprisonment. 3 The Catholic
answer, in a poll conducted that same year for the Missouri
Catholic
Conference,
was 40% death
and 60%
life
4
imprisonment. A recent Zogby International poll of more than
1,500 Catholics in the United States found 49% agreed with the
statement that "capital punishment is wrong under virtually all
circumstances," while 48% disagreed. 5 In general, national polls
indicate declining support among all Americans for the death
penalty in instances of murder. 6
This article will address four issues raised by the position of
the Catholic Church opposing the use of the death penalty. First,
can jurors be asked their religion? Is it a relevant question in
jury selection? Second, can Catholics even serve as jurors in
death penalty cases? Are they "death qualified" jurors within the
meaning of Witherspoon v. Illinois,7 and Wainwright v. Witt,' 8 or
is 32% Catholic); Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Facts About the Death Penalty (June 30,
2005), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf (listing the twelve states,
including Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin, without the death penalty);
see also Adherents.com, Largest Religious Groups in the United States of America
(2005), http://www.adherents.com/relUSA.html (asserting the population of the
United States is 26% Catholic).
12 See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 143 tbl.249,
available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t249.pdf (last visited Oct. 28,
2005).
"3Id. The Gallup poll does not track responses by religion, but the 2003 poll
reflects that Republicans (84%) are much more likely to prefer death then
Democrats (51%), and men (70%) are more likely than women (58%). Id. A strong
preference for life is expressed by Blacks (54%) and those with post-graduate
education (50%). Id.
14 Ctr. for Soc. Sci. & Pub. Policy Research, Telephone Survey of Missouri
Residents'
Opinions
on
the
Death
Penalty
(Nov.
1999),
http://www.umsl.edu/divisions/artscience/forlanglit/mbp/poll.html.
'5 Death
Penalty Info.
Ctr., Summaries of Recent Poll
Findings,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=23&did=210 (last visited Oct. 28,
2005) (click on "Zogby International" hyperlink).
16 See PollingReport.com, http://www.pollingreport.com/crime.htm (last visited
Oct. 28, 2005). For example, The Gallup Poll indicates that when asked whether
they support the death penalty for a person convicted of murder, Americans now
register 71% in favor, down from the high of 80% in 1994. See id.
17 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
18 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
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can they be challenged and removed for cause? Third, will our
system of peremptory challenges permit the systematic exclusion
of Catholics from juries in death penalty cases without running
afoul of the constitutional limits on the use of peremptory
challenges to engage in unlawful discrimination? Finally, the
question William F. Buckley, Jr., writing in the National Review,
posed for Justice Antonin Scalia: Should Catholics allow their
faith to affect their reasoning on whether a defendant should be
executed? 9
I.

VOIR DIRE QUESTIONING2 °

I will start with the easiest issue. The test for what may be
asked of prospective jurors is simple: Is the question relevant to
whether the juror has a bias or predisposition?2 Would you not
want to know if your jurors were Catholic if you were on trial for
an illegal abortion?2 2 Would you not want to know if your jurors
were Mormons if you were on trial for drunk driving?23 In a
death penalty trial, jurors will ordinarily be asked if they hold
any religious views that might affect their decision whether to
impose a sentence of death. 24 Frequently, this question is asked
in a written questionnaire before the juror is seated. The
" William F. Buckley, Jr., Can Catholics Decree Death?, NAT'L REV., Mar. 11,
2002, at 58, 59.
20 Voir dire is a phrase that "denotes the preliminary examination which the
court and attorneys make of prospective jurors to determine their qualification and
suitability to serve as jurors. Peremptory challenges or challenges for cause may
result from such examination." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1575 (6th ed. 1990).
2' Because the purpose of voir dire questioning is to assemble an impartial jury,
parties may only elicit information from potential jurors if that information is
relevant to establishing a juror's impartiality or fitness. See Douglas M. Bates, Jr.,
Voir Dire Examination in Criminal Jury Trials: What is the Proper Scope of
Inquiry?, FLA. B.J., Jan. 1996, at 64, 64.
22 See State v. Barnett, 445 P.2d 124, 125 (Or. 1968) (finding that voir dire
questioning about a potential juror's religion would be "obviously relevant" in a case
involving an illegal abortion).
23 See State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah 1984). The Utah Supreme Court
ruled it was error to disallow an inquiry to prospective jurors whether their choice
not to drink was "a personal conviction or a religious one?" because such a question
might have bearing upon the impartiality of the jury. Id. at 1056-60.
24 See, e.g., State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 772 (Minn. 1993) (allowing
generalized religious inquiries to be made during voir dire, such as whether the
potential juror could anticipate "any reason" she would be biased during trial). But
see Bader v. State, 40 S.W.3d 738, 741-43 (Ark. 2001) (finding that specific questions
regarding jurors' religious denominations and attendance rates at religious services
exceeded the bounds of appropriate inquiry).
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lawyers, and often the judge, will then follow up with additional
voir dire questions, and the religious affiliation of the juror will
emerge. So, let us assume, in response to a question about
religious views, a juror reveals that he or she is a practicing
Roman Catholic. The Catholic juror could then be asked whether
he or she agrees with the position espoused in the latest version
of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, which says:
The traditional teaching of the Church does not exclude,
presupposing full ascertainment of the identity and
responsibility of the offender, recourse to the death penalty,
when this is the only practicable way to defend the lives of
human beings effectively against the aggressor.
"If, instead, bloodless means are sufficient to defend against
the aggressor and to protect the safety of persons, public
authority should limit itself to such means, because they better
correspond to the concrete conditions of the common good and
are more in conformity to the dignity of the human person.
"Today, in fact, given the means at the State's disposal to
effectively repress crime by rendering inoffensive the one who
has committed it, without depriving him definitively of the
possibility of redeeming himself, cases of absolute necessity for
suppression of the offender
'today... are very rare, if
'25
practically non-existent.
Would agreement with this position automatically disqualify a
potential juror in a death penalty case?

II.

CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE

We should begin by noting that the position taken in the
Catechism of the Catholic Church does not automatically
preclude a death penalty in every case, nor does it preclude the
adherent from participating in the decision-making process to
determine if the death penalty is necessary in a particular case. 6
In Witherspoon v. Illinois,2 7 the United States Supreme
Court assessed the constitutionality of a death penalty imposed

25 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

ENG0015/__P7Z.HTM

(last visited

1 2267, http://www.vatican.va/archive/

Oct. 28, 2005) (quoting JOHN PAUL II,
56 (1995)). The Vatican's website
contains recent modifications to the Catechism by Pope John Paul II, which are
currently not available in print.
26 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
27 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
ENCYCLICAL LETTER EVANGELIUM VITAE
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by a jury selected pursuant to an Illinois statute.28 The statute
provided: " 'In trials for murder it shall be a cause for challenge
of any juror who shall, on being examined, state that he has
conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or that he is
opposed to the same.' ,29 At the defendant's trial, nearly half of
the prospective jurors were eliminated under the authority of
this statute. 30
The Court struck down the death sentence
imposed by the surviving jurors, and held that a "sentence of
death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or
recommended it was chosen by excluding [potential jurors] for
cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death
penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against
its infliction."'" In a footnote, the Court added that prospective
jurors could be excluded if they made it unmistakably clear that
they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital
punishment without regard to any evidence that might be
developed at the trial of the case before them.3 2 Many courts
subsequently adopted the standard expressed in the footnote, to
rule that a potential juror could not be excused unless he stated
with unmistakable clarity that he would never vote to impose the
death penalty under any circumstances.
In Wainwright v. Witt,3 3 the Court clarified the Witherspoon
standard,3 4 dispensing with the reference to "automatic" decisionmaking, as well as unmistakable clarity in the juror's position.3"
In Witt, the Court upheld the exclusion of a juror who simply had
been asked whether her personal objections to the death penalty
would interfere with judging the guilt or innocence of the
defendant.3 6 She had responded, "I think it would."3 7 The Court
ruled that a juror may be excluded for cause in a death penalty
case if the juror's views would " 'prevent or substantially impair

28 Id. at 513.
29

Id. at 512 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 743 (1959) (reenacted 1961)).

30 See id. at 513.

"' Id. at 522.

See id. at 522 n.21.
469 U.S. 412 (1985).
34 See supra text accompanying note 32.
32
13

3' Witt, 469 U.S. at 424-26.
36 Id. at 415-16, 430.
31

Id. at 416.
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the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his
instructions and his oath.' ,8
Thus, unless a Catholic juror believes the death penalty is
never appropriate under any circumstances-which is neither
the position of the Catechism of the Catholic Church39 nor the
position of the U.S. Catholic Bishops 4 0-he or she should not be
excluded from sitting on a jury in a death penalty case. Under
the Witherspoon standard,4 ' the Pope and every Catholic bishop
in America could be "death qualified" jurors. 42 Even under the
limitations of the Witt standard, 43 a Catholic juror who embraces
the Catechism of the Catholic Church can truthfully state that
his or her view would not " 'prevent or substantially impair the
performance of his [or her] duties as a juror ....
"v4 As the death
penalty is currently administered under the "guided discretion"
laws enacted in the wake of Furman v. Georgia4 5 and Gregg v.
Georgia,4 6 the jury is called upon to weigh the mitigating and
aggravating circumstances of the case and determine whether
death is the appropriate penalty under the law.4 7 Personal
38 Id. at 424 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
39 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
40 See U.S. Bishops, Statement on Capital Punishment, ORIGINS, Nov. 27, 1980,
at 373. Although the Statement calls for the abolition of death penalty laws, it does
not suggest that the death penalty is never appropriate under any circumstances.
See id.
41 See supra text accompanying note 32.
42 Under Witherspoon, any person that might consider the death penalty as a
possible punishment, even under extremely limited circumstances, would be deemed
a death qualified juror. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968).
The Catechism of the Catholic Church indicates that the death penalty may be
appropriate under certain circumstances. See supra text accompanying note 25.
Consequently, any Catholic that subscribes to this doctrine could be deemed a death
qualified juror.
43 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
4 Witt, 469 U.S. at 424 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)); see
also supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (discussing the Catechism).
4' 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). The Furman Court reversed three state
court decisions that previously affirmed petitioners' death sentences pursuant to
their state statutes. See id. at 239-40 (per curiam). These statutes gave the jury
unguided discretion to choose between imposing the death sentence and lesser
punishments. See id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring). The Court held that the death
penalty imposed pursuant to these state statutes "constitute[d] cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 239-40
(per curiam).
46 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The Gregg court upheld petitioner's death sentence
under a state statute that was amended after Furman.Id. at 196-98, 207.
41 "In the wake of Furman, Georgia amended its capital punishment
statute .... " Id. at 196. Accordingly, "the jury is authorized to consider any other
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objections to the death penalty law, or even a predisposition to
rarely utilize it, does not disqualify a juror either if he is willing
to set aside his own beliefs in deference to the rule of law, or his
beliefs would not actually preclude him from engaging in the
weighing process and returning a verdict of death.4 8
Certainly, during voir dire questioning, one who espouses
the view of the Catechism of the Catholic Church may be asked
whether his conclusion that today "absolute necessity" is very
rare 49 actually means that he would never impose the death
penalty under any circumstances. One could truthfully answer
"no" to that question. For example, the execution of a fanatic
terrorist bomber who is motivated to continue his terrorist
plotting even while confined to a jail cell could well justify a
death sentence consistent with the principles set forth in the

Catechism of the Catholic Church. °
If a Catholic juror truly believes that there are no
circumstances that could ever justify a sentence of death, he or
she would, and probably should, be disqualified as a juror.5 But
appropriate aggravating or mitigating circumstances." Id. at 197. "The Georgia
Legislature has plainly made an effort to guide the jury in the exercise of its
discretion ..
" Id. at 222.
48 See, e.g., People v. Stewart, 93 P.3d 271 (Cal. 2004). The Supreme Court of
California voided a death judgment because five jurors were excluded simply upon
the basis of their affirmative response to one or more of the following questions:
(1)Do you have a conscientious opinion or belief about the death penalty
which would prevent or make it very difficult for you:
(a)To find the defendant guilty of first degree murder regardless of what
the evidence might prove? () Yes () No
(b)To find a special circumstance to be true, regardless of what the evidence
might prove? () Yes () No
(c)To ever vote to impose the death penalty? () Yes () No.
Id. at 284 (quoting the juror questionnaire). The court concluded that even a juror
who would find it very difficult to impose a death penalty would not be
"substantially impaired" in performing his or her duties as a juror. Id. at 287.
49 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing the Catechism).
50 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (explaining that although cases of
absolute necessity are very rare, they may exist).
"' But see Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 528 (1968) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
In such instance, why should not an accused have the benefit of that
controlling principle of mercy in the community? Why should his fate be
entrusted exclusively to a jury that was either enthusiastic about capital
punishment or so undecided that it could exercise a discretion to impose it
or not, depending on how it felt about the particular case?
I see no constitutional basis for excluding those who are so opposed to
capital punishment that they would never inflict it on a defendant.
Exclusion of them means the selection of jurors who are either protagonists
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he or she is not obligated to hold that view as a Catholic. A
Catholic is not even obligated to hold the view espoused in the
Catechism of the Catholic Church because it does not represent
ex cathedra teaching. 52

III.

PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

The fact that a Catholic juror survives a challenge for cause
does not automatically put him in the jury box. Counsel for each
side is given the opportunity to exercise peremptory challenges,
and the number of peremptory challenges allowed is usually
increased in capital cases. 53 That leads us to our third question:
Does our system of peremptory challenges permit the systematic
exclusion of Catholics from juries in death penalty cases?
In Batson v. Kentucky,54 the United States Supreme Court
limited the exercise of peremptory challenges by ruling that the
exclusion of potential jurors solely on account of their race
violates the Equal Protection Clause." Where a prima facie
showing is made that a prosecutor has exercised peremptory
challenges on the basis of race, he or she is required to articulate
a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question.56
In a string of recent cases, courts have been asked to extend
Batson to discrimination on the basis of religion.5 7 Significantly,
of the death penalty or neutral concerning it. That results in a systematic
exclusion of qualified groups, and the deprivation to the accused of a crosssection of the community for decision on both his guilt and his punishment.
Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
52 For a description of ex cathedra teaching, see CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 37879 (Peter M. J. Stravinskas ed., 1991) ("Literally 'from the throne,' this Latin
expression is used to designate papal pronouncements of the greatest solemnity and
authority. Teachings pronounced ex cathedra are understood to be infallible.").
53 In a death penalty case, federal law allows each side twenty peremptory
challenges, compared to six for the government and ten for the defendant in
ordinary felony cases. See FED R. CRIM. P. 24(b). In California, each side is allowed
twenty peremptory challenges in death penalty cases, compared to the ten allowed
each side for any other offense punishable by imprisonment of greater than ninety
days. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 231(a) & (b) (Deering 2005).
54 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
'5 See id. at 89. It is important to note that the Batson rule was later extended
to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,
511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).
56 See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1991). The ultimate
burden of proving racial discrimination, however, remains on the defendant. See id.
at 359 ("[Tlhe trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his
burden of proving purposeful discrimination.").
" See infra notes 58-94 and accompanying text.
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many of these cases arise where black jurors have been excused,
and the prosecutor responds to the Batson challenge by citing the
juror's religious views. A good example is the decision of the
Virginia Supreme Court in James v. Commonwealth.58 After the
prosecutor, in a prosecution for cocaine distribution, used
peremptory challenges to remove two black jurors, he explained
that the reason one of these jurors was excused was not because
the juror was black, but because he was wearing a crucifix that
was approximately two inches long and wearing this visible
religious symbol was "indicative of a sympathetic disposition."5' 9
The Virginia Supreme Court upheld the conviction, refusing to
consider an argument, since it was not raised at trial, that
discrimination on the basis of visible religious affinity violates
both the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment.6 °
Similar arguments, however, have been considered in a number
of subsequent decisions of both state and federal courts. 6' The
consensus that emerges from these decisions draws a sharp
distinction between discrimination on the basis of religious
affiliation, which is generally not permitted, and discrimination
on the basis of religious beliefs, which is allowed.62
Two of the decisions, however, seem to countenance
discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation. In State v.
Davis,63 the Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld a conviction for
aggravated robbery despite the defendant's objection that the

58

442 S.E.2d 396 (Va. 1994).

59 See id. at 397.
60 Id. at 398 n.*.
61 See United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v.
DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1086 (2004); United
States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109 (7th Cir. 1998); State v. Purcell, 18 P.3d 113 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2001); Thorson v. State, 721 So.2d 590 (Miss. 1998), reh'g denied, No. 2002DP-01420-SCT, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 83, at *1 (Miss. Feb. 3, 2005); State v. Fuller, 812
A.2d 389 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002), rev'd, 862 A.2d 1130 (N.J. 2004).
62 See Brown, 352 F.3d at 669-70 & n.19; DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 510 ("Even
assuming that the exercise of a peremptory strike on the basis of religious affiliation
is unconstitutional, the exercise of a strike based on religious beliefs is not.");
Stafford, 136 F.3d at 1114; Purcell, 18 P.3d at 122 ("[W]e believe that Batson and
J.E.B., pursuant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments, prohibit the use of
peremptory strikes based upon one's religious affiliation but not based upon one's
relevant opinions, although such opinions may have a religious foundation."). But see
Thorson, 721 So.2d at 594 ("We find that Mississippi Constitutional and Statutory
law prohibit exercising peremptory challenges based solely on a person's religious
beliefs.").
63 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993).
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prosecutor's only explanation for excusing a black juror was that
64
the juror was a Jehovah's Witness.
The prosecutor explained:
I have a great deal of familiarity with the sect of Jahovah's [sic]
Witness. I would never, if I had a preemptory [sic] challenge
left,... fail to strike a Jahovah Witness from my jury.
In my experience.., that faith is very integral to their daily life
in many ways, many Christians are not. That was reenforced at
least three times a week he goes to church for separate
meetings. The Jahovah Witness faith is of a mind the higher
powers will take care of all things necessary. In my experience
Jahovah Witness are reluctant to exercise
65 authority over their
fellow human beings in this Court House.
Over the dissent of Chief Justice Wahl and Justice Page, the
majority ruled that Batson should not be extended to religious
bigotry, because it is not as prevalent, flagrant, or historically
ingrained in the jury selection process as is race.66 Apparently,
they never read Clarence Darrow's advice for picking juries.6 7
The United States Supreme Court later denied certiorari in the
Davis case over the dissents of Justices Thomas and Scalia.68
The other decision dealing with religious affiliation came
from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in Casarez v. Texas.69
There, the prosecutor argued for the removal of two AfricanAmerican jurors, not because they were African-Americans, but
because they were members of the Pentecostal Church. 70 He
explained:
It's been my experience... that people from that religion often
have a problem in passing judgment on other persons, and that
they often believe that that is a matter for God and not for man.
And that they have trouble not so much, Your Honor, although
some do, with the guilt phase of the trial, but especially the
punishment phase of the trial, and they are want to--want
probation rather than to be responsible, in their eyes,71 for
sending someone to the penitentiary, thereby judging them.

6

65

See id. at 767-68 (quoting the trial record).
Id. at 768 (alteration in original).

See id. at 771.
See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
68 Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115, 1115-16 (1994).
69 913 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
70 See id. at 470.
71 Id. at 496-97 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
6
67
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Again, over a vigorous and cogent dissent by Justice Baird-who,
not incidentally, lost his bid for reelection to that Court in the
next election-the majority ruled that Batson should not apply to
discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation.7 2 The majority
declared that "[b]ecause all members of the group share the same
faith by definition, it is not unjust to attribute beliefs
characteristic of the faith to all of them."73 These judges were
familiar with Clarence Darrow's advice for picking juries, as
evidenced by the fact that they quoted him in their opinion!74
The decisions reached in both Davis and Casarez are deeply
disturbing. They implicitly suggest that if a particular religious
sect is known to take their dogma seriously, then individual
members can be excluded as jurors simply by virtue of their
membership, without inquiry as to their individual views.75
Some courts have given explicit approval to such a
generalization, even while saying that they reject discrimination
7 6 for example,
on the basis of mere affiliation. In State v. Fuller,
the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court upheld
a defendant's conviction, despite the exclusion of an AfricanAmerican Muslim man from a jury.7 7 The court concluded that
the exclusion was not solely because he was a member of the
Muslim faith, but because he also dressed like a Muslim.7" The
prosecutor inferred from the juror's name and attire that he was
a Muslim and that he was "devout in his faith."7 9 He explained
that "people who tend to be demonstrative about their religions
tend to favor defendants to a greater extent than do persons who
are, shall we say, not as religious.""
Catholics, of course, are not known to be demonstrative
about their religion, nor are they a sect that is known for taking
its dogma too seriously, at least in America." Judge Baird took
note of this in his dissent in Casarez, arguing that a court should
72

See id. at 496.

73

Id.

74 See id. at 492.
71 See id. at 496 (declaring that it is reasonable to attribute beliefs characteristic

of a faith to all members of that faith).
76 812 A.2d 389 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2002).
17 Id. at 397.
78 See id. at 392-93 (describing the juror as wearing a long black outer garment
and a skull cap).
79 Id. at 395.
'o Id. at 393.
s See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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not assume every member of a religion subscribes to all of that
religion's teachings. 82 He wrote:
The Catholic Church officially condemns the use of artificial
contraceptives, but 84% of the members of the Catholic Church
believe Catholics should be allowed to use artificial
contraceptives.
Consequently, if a party peremptorily
challenged a Catholic [juror] because the party attributed to the
[juror] the Catholic Church's condemnation of the use of
artificial
contraceptives, the party would be wrong 84% of the
83
time.

Distinguishing between fundamentalists who take their
dogma seriously and other religious groups smacks of the
unworkable sectarian/non-sectarian distinction the United States
Supreme Court previously drew in cases involving school
funding.14 Similarly, we should not permit jurors to be dismissed
on the basis of broad generalizations about their churches or sect
memberships with no inquiry as to their individual views, simply
because we attribute particularly fervent or pervasive religious
views to that church or sect. 5
On the other hand, if a particular viewpoint or opinion would
interfere with the performance of a person's duties as a juror, it
should receive no greater protection simply because it is labeled a
"religious" viewpoint or a "moral" opinion.8 6 This brings us back
82

Casarez v. Texas, 913 S.W.2d 468, 501-02 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (Baird, J.,

dissenting).
83 Id. at 501 (citations omitted).

m See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 826 (2000) (explaining that "there was a
period when this factor mattered, particularly if the pervasively sectarian school was
a primary or secondary school.. . [b]ut that period is one that the Court should
regret, and it is thankfully long past"). "[T]he inquiry into the recipient's religious
views required by a focus on whether a school is pervasively sectarian is not only
unnecessary but also offensive .... [Hiostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools
has a shameful pedigree that we do not hesitate to disavow." Id. at 828.
85 See, e.g., Thorson v. Mississippi, 721 So.2d 590, 595 (Miss. 1998) (reversing a
death judgment because the only explanation offered by the prosecutor for striking a
juror was because she was a member of the Holiness faith). The Thorson court
declared: "Unlike race and gender, religious beliefs are not ordained at birth. A
person may belong to a particular religious group without adopting all of the tenets
and dogma of that religion. The critical determination is an individual's beliefs, not
the doctrines or dogma espoused by her religion." Id.
86 See Arizona v. Purcell, 18 P.3d 113, 122 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) ("[W]e believe
that.., the First and Fourteenth Amendments ... prohibit the use of peremptory
strikes based upon one's religious affiliation but not based upon one's relevant
opinions, although such opinions may have a religious foundation."); Minnesota v.
Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993) ("A juror's religious beliefs are inviolate,

368

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 44:355

to the issue of death penalty cases. The only decision to address
the use of a peremptory challenge to exclude a Catholic juror
from a death penalty trial comes to us from Arizona, in the case
of Arizona v. Purcell.8 7 The juror in question was not just a
member of the Catholic Church, but also a secretarial employee
of the Catholic Diocese of Phoenix. 8
During voir dire
questioning, she stated that she did not believe in capital
punishment, but she told the judge that her opinion would not
affect her ability to be fair and impartial. 9 Thus, she was not
subject to a challenge for cause, but the prosecutor did exercise a
peremptory challenge to remove her.9" When a Batson objection
was raised, the prosecutor offered the following explanation for
his peremptory challenge:
[Sihe works for the Diocese of Phoenix. The Bishop come [sic]
out specifically on Good Friday and said you Catholics should
start to be against the death penalty. The Pope has spoken
about that.
I feel that the pressure of whatever she may have said, her
work pressure and those kinds of pressures would be really too
much for her when it really came down to it to completely be
objective with regard to premeditated murder if she felt that
would then make an option for this defendant to be sentenced
[to death].
[T]here are specifically two specific statements [in her
questionnaire]: "I can say that I am against the death penalty."
And then again... "I am against the death penalty."
I feel that the pressure for her being employed by the diocese
91
would be too much for her. And that's my articulated reason.
The Court then inquired, "So you're saying, you said being
employed by the diocese, being Catholic and being employed, not
just being Catholic; is that correct?" The prosecutor responded,
"Correct." 92

The Arizona Court of Appeals upheld the exercise of the
peremptory challenge, because it was based upon her
but when they are the basis for a person's moral

values and produce societal
views ... it would not seem that a peremptory strike based on these societal views
should be attributed to a pernicious religious bias.").
87 18 P.3d 113.
88 Id. at 118.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 118-19 (quoting juror questionnaire).
92 Id. at 119.
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employment relationship and her personal views concerning the
death penalty, not her religious affiliation. 93 Thus, Catholics may
not be systematically excluded from death penalty juries by
peremptory challenges, but can certainly be selectively excluded,
depending upon their individual views toward the death
94
penalty.
This means that a good many Catholics have sat on death
penalty juries, and we can anticipate they will continue to do so.
First, their individual views on the death penalty may not reflect
the current position of the Catechism of the Catholic Church.9 5
Second, even if they accept the current position of the Catechism,
they might get past the peremptory challenge stage because the
prosecutor feels they can be trusted to put their personal beliefs
aside and follow the jury instructions, or because the prosecutor
simply ran out of peremptory challenges. 9 Juror Number Two in
the California murder trial of Scott Peterson, which resulted in a
verdict of death, was "a devout Catholic who needed to consult
his priest after receiving his jury summons because he was
troubled by the thought of sentencing someone to die."9 7 This
leads us to the final question, the one which William Buckley
posed for Justice Scalia: Should the faith of Catholic jurors affect
their reasoning on whether a defendant should be executed? 98
IV. DEATH DELIBERATIONS

Another way to ask this question is to inquire whether jurors
should "compartmentalize" their religious or moral views and
attempt to ignore them in reaching their decision? Although I
think President Bill Clinton deserves the heavyweight title for
being the "Great Compartmentalizer, 99 Justice Antonin Scalia

9' See id. at 122-23.
94 See id. ("Although

Juror 8's religious views were intertwined with these other
factors, her religious membership was not the basis for striking her from the jury
panel, and her opposition to capital punishment was a legitimate basis for exercising
a peremptory strike.").
95 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
96 See JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN
COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 139-75 (1977).
97 abc7news.com, Who Are the Peterson Jurors?, http://abclocal.go.com/Kgo/

news/peterson052804_nw-petersontrial.html (last updated May 28, 2004).
9' See Buckley, supra note 19, at 59.
9 See Gerald F. Uelmen, The Great Compartmentalizer, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Jan. 24, 1999, at Cl; see also Gerald F. Uelmen, Compartmentalizing the
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certainly comes in a close second. He describes his role as a
Justice of the Supreme Court as follows:
I try mightily to prevent my religious views or my political
views or my philosophical views from affecting my
interpretation of the laws, which is what my job is about.
I read texts. I'm always reading a text and trying to give it the
fairest interpretation possible. That's all I do. How can my
religious views have anything to do with that? They can make
me leave the bench if I find that I'm enmeshed in an immoral
operation, but the only one of my religious views that has
anything to do with my job as a judge is the seventh
I try to observe that
commandment-thou shalt not lie.
faithfully, but other than that I don't think any of my religious
views have anything to do with how I do my job as a judge.
Clearly, the role assigned to a juror in our system is very
different from the role assigned to a Justice of the Supreme
Court. A Supreme Court Justice interprets the meaning of the
constitution and statutes, but does not engage in the kind of
normative determination jurors are expected to make in a death
penalty case.'0 ' Here is how the jurors' task is described in the
instructions given to the jury in every death penalty case tried in
California:
The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
does not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on each
side of an imaginary scale, or the arbitrary assignment of
weights to any of them. You are free to assign whatever moral
or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of
the various factors you are permitted to consider. In weighing
the various circumstances you determine under the relevant
evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by
considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances with
the totality of the mitigating circumstances. To return a
judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the
aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison

Presidency; Impeachment: The Public is Willing to Separate the President's
Achievements from his Immorality, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1999, at B7.
'oo Antonin Scalia, Pew Forum Conference: A Call for Reckoning: Religion & the
Death Penalty, Session Three: Religion, Politics, and the Death Penalty (Jan. 25,
2002) (transcript available online at http://pewforum.org/deathpenalty/resourcesl
transcript3.php3).
1o" See SCOTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE
DEATH PENALTY 177-79 (2005) (highlighting the difference between having a jury
composed of twelve persons decide a verdict versus a single judge).
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with the mitigating circumstances
that it warrants death
02
instead of life without parole.
Justice Scalia suggests that jurors deliberating the death penalty
should compartmentalize and ignore their religious beliefs, as
should governors in reviewing clemency petitions:
[I]f I were in that position as either a juror or a governor I
wouldn't feel free to act upon my own religious beliefs. I'm
there representing the community. If I were a governor, as to
whether I should commute a sentence, I would want standards.
I would say it seems to me the sentence ought to be commuted if
these factors exist, but not because I'm a bleeding-heart
03
Christian. That ought to have nothing to do with it.1
While Justice Scalia's point may have limited relevance to a
governor considering a pardon application,0 4 it is an inaccurate
characterization of the juror's role, at least in a death penalty
case.10 5
While jurors are drawn from a cross-section of the
community, they are not put in the jury box to "represent"
anyone. 0 6 They have no constituency, and are not answerable to
the "community" for how they vote. 10 7 As Judge Learned Hand
famously observed:
The individual can forfeit his liberty-to say nothing of his
life-only at the hands of those who, unlike any official, are in
no wise accountable, directly or indirectly, for what they do, and
who at once separate and melt anonymously in the community
from which they came.... [S]ince if they acquit their verdict is

102 COMM.

ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL,

OF THE SUPERIOR

COURT OF L.A. COUNTY, CAL., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 8.88

(2005).

103
'04

Scalia, Pew Forum Conference, supra note 100.
The power to pardon is most often characterized as the power to dispense

mercy, very different than the power of a reviewing court, but governors are elected
officials who are answerable to the public. See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS:
JUSTICE, MERCY AND THE PUBLIC EXPERIENCE 213 (1989). Moore concludes that
"[giranting a pardon is a duty of justice that follows from the principle that
punishment should not exceed what is deserved." Id. at 12.
'05 See RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE

JUDICIAL PROCESS 283 (2001) (discussing the important role that juries play in
capital punishment cases).
106 See VAN DYKE, supra note 96, at xiv (explaining that "[e]ach person
comes to
the jury box as an individual, not as a representative of an ethnic, racial, or age
group").
107 See id. at xi-xiii (noting the importance of impartiality in the jury
selection
process).
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final, no one is likely to suffer of whose conduct they do not
morally disapprove.... 108
The relevance of jurors' religious views to death deliberations
was recently presented to the California Supreme Court in People
v. Lewis.1" 9 In this case, the defendant challenged his sentence of
death on the grounds of juror misconduct, establishing that all
twelve jurors held hands and prayed at the beginning of their
deliberations, and that the jury foreperson told one reluctant
juror that "he did not know if it would help her, but what had
helped him make his decision was that [defendant] had been
exposed to Jesus Christ and if that was in fact true [defendant]
would have 'everlasting life' regardless of what happened to
him."1 ° The Court rejected the contention that the jurors relied
upon outside sources or "extraneous law" in reaching their
verdict."11
In an opinion authored by Justice Ming Chin, a
Roman Catholic, the Court concluded:
That jurors may consider their religious beliefs during penalty
deliberations is also to be expected....

Given the collective

nature of jury deliberations, we do not find it unusual, much
less improper, that jurors here may have shared their beliefs
with other jurors either through conversations or prayers.
We find nothing in the record, moreover, that suggests the
jurors disregarded the law or the court's instructions, and
instead imposed a higher or different law. The fact that some
jurors expressed their religious beliefs or held hands and prayed
during deliberations may have reflected their need to reconcile
the difficult decision-possibly sentencing a person to deathwith their religious beliefs and personal views. But it does not
show that jurors supplanted the12law or instructions with their
own religious views and beliefs.'
Last year, the California Supreme Court, relying on Lewis,
upheld a death verdict despite the fact that two jurors shared
Bible quotations with fellow jurors and consulted their pastors
for advice during the jury deliberations.'13 Although the court
found that this conduct violated the jurors' instructions, it

108

United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1942).

109 28 P.3d 34 (Cal. 2001).
110 Id. at 71 (alteration in original).

. Id. at 72-73.
12 Id. at 73 (citations omitted).
113 See People v. Danks, 82 P.3d 1249, 1268-69, 1274-75, 1281 (Cal. 2004).
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concluded that the misconduct was not prejudicial. 1 4 In the
majority opinion, Justice Janice Rogers Brown emphasized that:
[N]othing in our opinion is intended to convey that a juror's
consideration of personal religious, philosophical, or secular
normative values is improper during penalty deliberations. As
we have repeatedly stated, the task of jurors at the penalty
phase is qualitatively different from that at the guilt phase. At
the penalty phase, jurors are asked to make a normative
determination-one which necessarily includes moral and
11 5
ethical considerations-designed to reflect community values.
Although there is some variance in how different states' death
penalty laws define the role of the jury in deciding between death
and life imprisonment, the insistence that the jury's decision is a
normative judgment which will be strongly influenced by the
religious, moral, and ethical views of the jurors resonates in the
decisions of many courts. 16 In Georgia, prosecutors take great
delight in quoting Eberhart v. Georgia,' 7 an 1873 Georgia
Supreme Court decision, to jurors in death penalty cases. 1 8 In
Eberhart, a Reconstruction-era justice authored a diatribe
against "that sickly sentimentality that springs into action
whenever a criminal is at length about to suffer for crime."1"9 He
wrote, "We have had too much of this mercy. It is-pot true mercy.
It only looks to the criminal.... ,,2 In eight separate opinions,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has
condemned the reading of Eberhart to jurors. 2' In the most
recent of these rulings, the Court declared:

114

See id. at 1274-75.

"'

Id. at 1277 (citations omitted).

See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
47 Ga. 598 (1873).
118 See, e.g., Hardy v. State, 371 S.E.2d 849, 849 (Ga. 1988).
119 Id. at 610.
120 Id.; see also Nelson v. Nagle, 995 F.2d 1549, 1555-58 (11th Cir. 1993)
(discussing the Eberhartopinion and its subsequent use); Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d
1449, 1467-69 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (Hill, J., concurring) (discussing the Eberhartopinion
and its subsequent use).
121See Romine v. Head, 253 F.3d 1349, 1366-67 (11th Cir. 2001); Nelson, 995
F.2d at 1555-56; Presnell v. Zant, 959 F.2d 1524, 1529 (11th Cir. 1992); Wilson v.
Kemp, 777 F.2d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 1985); Bowen v. Kemp, 769 F.2d 672, 680-81
(11th Cir. 1985), affd on reh'g, 832 F.2d 546 (11th Cir. 1987); Drake, 762 F.2d at
1467-69 (Hill, J., concurring); Potts v. Zant, 734 F.2d 526, 535-37 (11th Cir. 1984),
vacated, 478 U.S. 1017 (1986); Drake v. Francis, 727 F.2d 990, 995-96 (11th Cir.
1984).
116

117
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The Eberhartargument is wrong on the law, because mercy is
acceptable in post-Furman capital sentencing regimes, and if
anything, is particularly favored under Georgia's statute, which
permits the jury in its unbridled discretion to impose a life
sentence regardless of the number or strength of aggravating
circumstances. Telling a Georgia capital sentencing jury that
the state supreme court, or a justice of it, or some judge or legal
scholar has decided that they should not even consider mercy
misleads the jury about one of its central tasks, which is to
decide whether the individual, convicted murderer standing
before it should receive mercy.122

Many courts have expressed strong disapproval of
prosecutors who quote the Bible in an effort to persuade jurors to
impose the death penalty.'2 3 Some courts have even held that
122

Romine, 253 F.3d at 1367-68 (citations omitted).

123 See Commonwealth v. Chambers, 599 A.2d 630, 644 (Pa. 1991) (declaring

that prosecutors who recite Bible quotations in support of the death penalty commit
per se reversible error and may be subject to disciplinary action); see also Carruthers
v. State, 528 S.E.2d 217, 221-23 (Ga. 2000) (indicating its disapproval of prosecutors
that quote the Bible to support the death penalty); Commonwealth v. Brown, 711
A.2d 444, 456-58 (Pa. 1998) (applying Chambers to reverse a death judgment). But
cf. Gerald F. Uelmen, Op-Ed., The Nincompoops Aren't in the Jury Box; The Law: A
Pennsylvania Court Bars Even Oratorical References to the Bible, a Further
Distancing of Justice from Intelligent Real Life, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1991, at 7
(criticizing the Chambers decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court).
The best cure for Bible-thumping prosecutors is Bible-thumping defense
lawyers. If Karl Chambers were being defended by Clarence Darrow, there
wouldn't have even been an objection to the prosecutor's argument. Darrow
would simply have pulled a Bible out of his beat-up briefcase and turned to
Exodus. He would have reminded the jurors that the same Bible that
commands the death of murderers also commands the execution of
adulterers, witches, those who have sex with animals, and anyone who
reviles or curses his mother or father.
He would have noted that the Bible contains some curious exceptions,
such as the one for a man who beats his slave to death ....
Finally, Darrow
would have turned to the New Testament, and read to the jurors the words
of Jesus Christ when he was invited to participate in an execution: "Let
anyone among you who is without sin be the first to cast a stone at her."
The point is not whether the Bible supports or condemns capital
punishment. The point is that jurors are intelligent enough to give the
Bible the weight it deserves, and lawyers should be free to address jurors
as though they are intelligent human beings.
Id. For a discussion on whether religious arguments should be made before juries,
see generally Elizabeth A. Brooks, Thou Shalt Not Quote the Bible: Determining the
Propriety of Attorney Use of Religious Philosophy and Themes in Oral Argument, 33
GA. L. REV. 1113 (1999). Few cases have discussed the use of Biblical quotations by
defense attorneys. But cf. State v. Haselden, 577 S.E.2d 594, 608-09 (N.C. 2003)
(overruling a claim of error based on Bible quotations by the prosecutor, and noting
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jurors who consult the Bible in the jury room commit
misconduct. 2 4
This strict prohibition against referencing
extraneous sources has never, however, been extended to a
juror's religious convictions. As noted by one court in an oftquoted passage: "The court in no way means to suggest that
jurors cannot rely on their personal faith and deeply-held beliefs
when facing the awesome decision ' 25
of whether to impose the
sentence of death on a fellow citizen."'
I find a striking parallel between the way that our courts
deal with the injection of religion into death deliberations and
the way that they deal with the issue of jury nullification. Both
are treated like crocodiles in the bathtub. We are constantly
aware of their presence, but make a studied effort to ignore them.
While a jury has the undeniable power to ignore the law and
acquit a defendant simply because they believe the law under
which the defendant is being prosecuted is unjust, Courts
consistently refuse to instruct juries that they have this power,
and will not permit lawyers to urge juries to exercise it. 26 Some
courts have even permitted the removal of individual jurors who
seem intent upon exercising their power of nullification, to the
dismay of their fellow jurors. 27 But jurors who consider their
personal religious values in a death penalty case are not engaged
in jury nullification. They are not choosing to ignore the law.
They are following it. Why not tell them that, by instructing
them: "You may consider your personal religious, moral, and
ethical values and beliefs in weighing the aggravating and

that "prosecutors are forced to anticipate and address the potential Biblical
arguments that defendants often make in death cases").
124 See Jones v. Kemp, 706 F. Supp. 1534, 1560 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
125 Id.
126

See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972)

("The fact that there is widespread existence of the jury's prerogative, and approval
of its existence as a 'necessary counter to case-hardened judges and arbitrary
prosecutors,' does not establish as an imperative that the jury must be informed by
the judge of that power.") (footnote omitted).
127 See People v. Cleveland, 21 P.3d 1225, 1231-32 (Cal. 2001) (holding that the
need to keep jury deliberations secret does not prohibit reasonable inquiry by the
court into allegations of jury misconduct, and thus making it easier for trial courts to
eliminate jurors who refuse to deliberate). But see United States v. Thomas, 116
F.3d 606, 621-22 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that a deliberating juror can only be
excused if it is beyond possibility that the juror's opinions rest on the sufficiency of
the government's evidence, thus, making it harder for courts to dismiss jurors who
refuse to deliberate).
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mitigating factors and deciding whether death or life
imprisonment is justified as the punishment in this case."
Perhaps one reason defense lawyers do not request such an
instruction, and oppose it if it is requested by the prosecution, is
because they fear that more jurors will rely upon religious views
that favor the death penalty. The process by which we select
jurors for death penalty trials fully justifies that fear. 21 Jurors
whose religious views disfavor death are less likely to make it
through the selection process than jurors whose religious views
encourage its use. 129
There are many deeply-held beliefs that may influence a
Catholic juror's decision whether to impose a sentence of death,
apart from the church's position on the death penalty. Belief in
personal redemption for one's sins might persuade one that life
without the possibility of parole is a more appropriate sentence
because it provides an opportunity for redemption. Belief in a
final judgment to be rendered by God might also influence a juror
to exercise mercy. Additionally, acceptance of the presence of
Christ in every other person, even a murderer, could have a
profound impact on the choice between death and life
imprisonment. Catholics who serve as jurors in death penalty
cases need not "compartmentalize" and ignore such beliefs.
Being a "bleeding-heart Christian" should have much to do with
the way that a Catholic makes the momentous choice that our
death penalty laws place in the hands and hearts of jurors.
CONCLUSION

Preparing this article led me to ask myself: How much does
my being a Catholic have to do with my opposition to the death
penalty? I started out in my legal career after eighteen years of
Catholic education-eight of them with the Jesuits-as a
prosecutor. I had no qualms about the death penalty, although I
never had to ask a jury for a death sentence. Fifteen years later,
I concluded that the death penalty is unethical, immoral, and
unacceptable under any circumstances. I would not be a "death
qualified" juror, and if I were a judge, I would have to recuse
myself in a death penalty case. I reached that conclusion not
because of anything that the Pope or any bishop had to say about
128

See supra Parts II, III.

129

See supra Parts II, III.
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it, although giving respectful consideration to those views has
certainly reinforced my own. I must confess that I was most
impressed by what Mother Theresa had to say after she came to
California and visited our death row at San Quentin. After
surveying the rows of cells in which we now confine more than
640 men to await a final walk to the death chamber, she poked
her bony finger into the chest of the burly guard who escorted her
and said, "Remember, what you do to these men, you do to
God." 130
I reached my judgment about the death penalty because,
both as a prosecutor and a defense lawyer, I have seen first hand
the imperfections of our system of justice. I still believe it is the
best system of justice in the world. But nevertheless, it simply
cannot be trusted to reliably, fairly, and consistently sort out who
should live and who should die. I think a lottery would be a
better system.
If we sentenced every murderer to life
imprisonment and a lottery ticket, then once a year we conducted
the "big spin" to pick sixty or seventy to be executed, we would
save billions of dollars and achieve approximately the same
result that our current system of appeals and habeas corpus
petitions and writs of certiorari accomplish. Now, is that a
position based upon an ethical or moral judgment? I suppose it
is. And I really cannot compartmentalize it and separate it from
my religious faith. What I am really saying is that it is morally
wrong for the state to take the life of a criminal, unless the state
has a flawless system of justice to reliably, fairly, and
consistently determine who should and who should not be
executed. I believe it is simply impossible for human beings to
devise a flawless system of justice. If you reject my "big spin" as
immoral, you should reject the death penalty on the same
grounds of immorality.
I am not advocating or suggesting that Catholics should
misrepresent their views opposing capital punishment in order to
get on juries and "sabotage" the administration of the death
penalty. Catholics who fully agree with my views should openly
express them, and accept the consequences of dismissal as jurors.
Catholic judges who agree with me should recuse themselves in
death cases. Catholic prosecutors who agree with me should
130 Gerald F. Uelmen, Capital Punishment: Looking the Condemned in the Eyes
Brings New View, SANTA CLARA MAG., Summer 1990, at 47.
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decline to accept assignments as prosecutors in death cases. As
the proportion of jurors, judges, and prosecutors who refuse to
participate in the continued administration of a morally
bankrupt law continues to grow, more and more states will
reconsider the wisdom of continuing this folly, and will join with
the civilized nations of the world in rejecting laws that permit
death as a penalty.

